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DEPENDENT ARISING AND THE EMPTINESS

Jay L. Garfield

OF EMPTINESS: WHY DID NAGARJUNA
START WITH CAUSATION?

1. Introduction

Professor of Philosophy

in the School of

Nagarjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the first century

Communications and

C.E., is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied
Cognitive Science at
Mahayana Buddhist philosopher. He is the founder of the Madhyamika,
Hampshire College
or Middle Path, schools of Mahayana Buddhism. His considerable corpus
includes texts addressed to lay audiences, letters of advice to kings, and
the set of penetrating metaphysical and epistemological treatises that
represent the foundation of the highly skeptical and dialectical analytic
philosophical school known as Madhyamika. Most important of these is
his largest and best-known text, the Muilamadhyamikakarika-in English,
Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Way. This text in turn inspires a huge
commentarial literature in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese. Divergences in interpretation of the Mulamadhyamikakarika often
determine the splits between major philosophical schools. So, for instance, the distinction between two of the three major Mahayana philo-

sophical schools, Svatantrika-Madhyamika and Prasargika-Madhyamika,
reflect, inter alia, distinct readings of this text, itself taken as fundamental

by scholars within each of these schools.
The treatise itself is composed in very terse, often cryptic verses, with

much of the explicit argument suppressed, generating significant interpretative challenges. But the uniformity of the philosophical methodology

and the clarity of the central philosophical vision expressed in the text
together provide a considerable fulcrum for exegesis. The central topic of
the text is emptiness-the Buddhist technical term for the lack of inde-

pendent existence, inherent existence, or essence in things. Nagarjuna
relentlessly analyzes phenomena or processes that appear to exist independently and argues that they cannot so exist, and yet, though lacking
the inherent existence imputed to them either by naive common sense
or by sophisticated, realistic philosophical theory, these phenomena are
not nonexistent-they are, he argues, conventionally real.
This dual thesis of the conventional reality of phenomena together
with their lack of inherent existence depends upon the complex doctrine

of the two truths or two realities-a conventional or nominal truth and

Philosophy East & West

Volume 44, Number 2
an ultimate truth-and upon a subtle and surprising doctrine regarding
April 1994
their relation. It is, in fact, this sophisticated development of the doctrine
219-250

of the two truths as a vehicle for understanding Buddhist metaphysics
and epistemology that is Nagarjuna's greatest philosophical contribution.
? 1994
If the analysis in terms of emptiness is the substantial heart of Mulamaby University of
Hawaii Press
dhyamikakarika, the method of reductio ad absurdum is the methodolog-
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ical core. Nagarjuna, like Western skeptics, systematically eschews the
defense of positive metaphysical doctrines regarding the nature of things,
demonstrating rather that any such positive thesis is incoherent, and that

in the end our conventions and our conceptual framework can never be
justified by demonstrating their correspondence to an independent real-

ity. Rather, he suggests, what counts as real depends precisely upon our
conventions.'

For Nagarjuna and his followers, this point is connected deeply and
directly with the emptiness of phenomena. That is, for instance, when
Madhyamika philosopher says of a table that it is empty, that assertio
by itself is incomplete. It invites the question, "empty of what?" And the
answer is: "empty of inherent existence, or self-nature, or, in more West-

ern terms, essence." Now, to say that the table is empty is hence simpl

to say that it lacks essence and, importantly, not to say that it is com
pletely nonexistent. To say that it lacks essence, the Madhyamika philoso-

pher will explain, is to say, as the Tibetans like to put it, that it does no
exist "from its own side"-that its existence as the object that it is, as a

table, depends not only upon it or on any purely nonrelational character

istics, but upon us as well. That is, if this kind of furniture had not evolve
in our culture, what appears to us to be an obviously unitary object might

instead be correctly described as five objects: four quite useful sticks
absurdly surmounted by a pointless slab of stick-wood waiting to be

carved. It is also to say that the table depends for its existence on its parts,

on its causes, on
table. The table,
chosen by us as
manding, on its
its essence. That

its material, and so forth. Apart from these, there is n
we might say, is a purely arbitrary slice of space-time
the referent of a single name, and not an entity deown, recognition and a philosophical analysis to reveal
independent character is precisely what it lacks, on th

view.

And this analysis in terms of emptiness-an analysis refusing t

characterize the nature of any thing, precisely because it denies that w

can make sense of the idea of a thing's nature-proceeding by th
relentless refutation of any attempt to provide such a positive analysis, is

applied by Nagarjuna to all phenomena, including, most radically, empt
ness itself. For if Nagarjuna merely argued that all phenomena are empty,

one might justly indict him for in fact merely replacing one analysis o
things with another; that is, with arguing that emptiness is in fact th
essence of all things. But Nagarjuna, as we shall see, argues that emptiness itself is empty. It is not a self-existent void standing behind the veil

Philosophy East & West

of illusion represented by conventional reality, but merely an aspect o
conventional reality. And this, as we shall see, is what provides the key
to understanding the deep unity between the two truths.
While Nagarjuna is a powerfully original thinker, he is clearly and
self-consciously operating squarely within the framework of Buddhis
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philosophy. Therefore, Nagarjuna accepts, and takes it as incumbent
upon him, to provide an account of the Four Noble Truths. Moreover, he

takes it as a fundamental philosophical task to provide an understanding
of what Buddhist philosophy refers to as pratTtyasammutpada-dependent co-origination. This term denotes the nexus between phenomena in
virtue of which events depend on other events, composites depend upon
their parts, and so forth. Just how this dependency is spelled out, and just
what is its status is a matter of considerable debate within Buddhist

philosophy, just as the nature of causation and explanation is a matter of
great dispute within Western philosophy. Nagarjuna is very much concerned to stake out a radical and revealing position in this debate. I will
argue that this position provides the key to understanding his entire text.

The Mulamadhyamikakarika is divided into twenty-seven chapters.
The first chapter addresses dependent origination. While many Western
commentators assert that this chapter opens the text simply because it
addresses a "fundamental doctrine of Buddhism" (Kalupahana 1986), I will
argue that Nagarjuna begins with causation for deeper, more systematic
reasons. In chapters 2 through 23, Nagarjuna addresses a wide range
of phenomena, including external perceptibles, psychological processes,
relations, and putative substances and attributes, arguing that all are
empty. In the final four chapters, Nagarjuna replies to objections and
generalizes the particular analyses into a broad theory concerning the
nature of emptiness itself and the relation between the two truths, emptiness and dependent arising itself. It is generally, and in my view correctly,

acknowledged that chapter 24, the examination of the Four Noble Truths,

is the central chapter of the text and the climax of the argument. One

verse of this chapter, verse 18, has received so much attention that
interpretations of it alone represent the foundations of major Buddhist
schools in East Asia:

Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation
Is itself the middle way.

Here Nagarjuna asserts the fundamental identity of (1) emptiness, or the
ultimate truth, (2) the dependently originated-that is, all phenomena-

and (3) verbal convention. Moreover, he asserts that understanding this
relation is itself the middle-way philosophical view he articulates in the
Mulamadhyamikakarika. This verse and the discussion in the chapters that
follow provide the fulcrum for CandrakTrti's more explicit characterization

of the emptiness of emptiness as an interpretation of Nagarjuna's philosophical system-the interpretation that is definitive of the PrasargikaMadhyamika school. In what follows I will provide an interpretation of this

central verse and its context that harmonizes with Candrakirti's and Jay L. Garfield
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argue that, in fact, this doctrine is already to be found in the opening
chapter of the text-the examination of conditions. Reading the text in
this way, I will argue, locates the doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness
not only as a dramatic philosophical conclusion to be drawn at the end
of twenty-four chapters of argument, but as the perspective implicit in
the argument from the very beginning, and only rendered explicit in
chapter 24. Reading the text in this way, I will suggest, also shows us
exactly how 24:18 is to be understood, and just why a proper understanding of causality is so central to Buddhist philosophy.
I will begin by offering a philosophical reading of chapter 1. I will

argue that Nagarjuna distinguishes two possible views of dependent
origination or the causal process-one according to which causes bring
about their effects in virtue of causal powers and one according to which
causal relations simply amount to explanatorily useful regularities-and
defends the latter. This, I will argue, when suitably fleshed out, amounts
to Nagarjuna's doctrine of the emptiness of causation. I will then turn
immediately to chapter 24, focusing on the link between emptiness,
dependent origination, and convention, and developing the theory of the
emptiness of emptiness. With this in hand, we will return to chapter 1,
showing how this doctrine is anticipated in the initial discussion of causation. Finally, I will show quickly how this way of reading the texts changes

the way we would read subsequent chapters, and I will make a few general remarks about the moral of this textual exercise for an understanding
of the centrality of causation to metaphysics and for an understanding of

the remarkably pragmatic outlook of Madhyamika philosophy.

2. Chapter 1-Examination of Conditions
Central to this first chapter is the distinction between causes and
conditions (Skt hetu and pratyaya [Tib rGyu and rKyen]. This distinction
is variously drawn and is controversial,2 and is arguably differently under-

stood in Sanskrit and Tibetan. The way I will understand it here, I argue,
makes good, coherent sense not only of this chapter, but of the Mulamadhyamikakarika as a whole. Briefly, we will understand this distinction as

follows: When Nagarjuna uses the word "cause" (hetu [rGyu]), he has in
mind an event or state that has in it a power(kriya[Bya Ba]) to bring about

its effect, and has that power as part of its essence or nature (svabhava
[Rang bZhin]). When he uses the term "condition," on the other hand
(pratyaya [rKyen]), he has in mind an event, state, or process that can be
appealed to in explaining another event, state, or process, without any
metaphysical commitment to any occult connection between explan-

andum and explanans. In chapter 1, Nagarjuna, we shall see, argues
against the existence of causes and for the existence of a variety of kinds
Philosophy East & West

of conditions.3
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The argument against causation is tightly intertwined with the posi-

tive account of dependent arising and of the nature of the relation
between conditions and the conditioned. Nagarjuna begins by stating the
conclusion (1:1): neither are entities self-caused nor do they come to be
through the power of other entities. That is, there is no causation, when
causation is thought of as involving causal activity.4 Nonetheless, he
notes (1:2), there are conditions-in fact four distinct kinds-that can be

appealed to in the explanation and prediction of phenomena. An example might be useful to illustrate the difference between the four kinds of

condition, and the picture Nagarjuna will paint of explanation. Suppose
that you ask, "Why are the lights on?" I might reply as follows: (1) Because

I flicked the switch. I have appealed to an efficient condition. Or (2)
because the wires are in good working order, the bulbs haven't burned
out, and the electricity is flowing. These are supporting conditions. Or (3)

the light is the emission of photons each of which is emitted in response
to the bombardment of an atom by an electron, and so forth. I have
appealed to a chain of immediate conditions. Or (4) so that we can see.

This is the dominant condition. Any of these would be a perfectly good

answer to the "Why?" question. But note that none of them makes
reference to any causal powers or necessitation.
The next three verses are crucial. Nagarjuna first notes (1:3) that in
examining a phenomenon and its relations to its conditions, we do not

find that phenomenon somehow contained potentially in those conditions. Now, on the reading of this chapter, I will suggest, we can see
conditions simply as useful explanans. Using this language, we can see
Nagarjuna as urging that even distinguishing clearly between explanans
and explanandum as distinct entities, with the former containing potentially what the latter has actually, is problematic. What we are typically
confronted with in nature is a vast network of interdependent and continuous processes, and carving out particular phenomena for explanation
or for use in explanations depends more on our explanatory interests
and language than on joints nature presents to us. Through addressing
the question of the potential existence of an event in its conditions,
Nagarjuna hints at this concealed relation between praxis and reality.
Next, Nagarjuna notes (1:4) that in exploiting an event or entity as a
condition in explanation, we do not thereby ascribe it any causal power.
Our desire for light does not exert some occult force on the lights. Nor is

there anything to be found in the flicking of the switch other than the

plastic, metal, movement, and connections visible to the naked eye.
Occult causal powers are singularly absent. On the other hand, Nagarjuna
points out in the same breath that this does not mean that conditions are
explanatorily impotent. In a perfectly ordinary sense-not that which the

metaphysicians of causation have in mind-our desire is active in the

Jay L. Garfield
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production of light. But not in the sense that it contains light potentially,

or some special causal power that connects our minds to the bulbs.5
What is it, then, about some sets of event pairs, but not others, that
make them dependently related, if not some causal link present in some
cases but not in others? Nagarjuna replies (1: 5) that it is the regularities
that count. Flickings give rise to illuminations. So they are conditions of
them. If they didn't, they wouldn't be. Period. Explanation relies on regu-

larities. Regularities are explained by reference to further regularities.
Adding active forces or potentials adds nothing of explanatory utility to
the picture.6

In reading the next few verses we must be hermeneutically cautious,
and pay careful attention to Nagarjuna's use of the term "existent" (satah

[Yodpa]) and its negative contrastive "nonexistent" (asatah [Medpa]). For
Nagarjuna is worried here about inherent existence and inherent nonexistence, as opposed to conventionalexistence or nonexistence. Though
this will become clearer as we go along, keep in mind for the present that
for a thing to exist inherently is for it to exist in virtue of possessing an
essence; for it to exist independently of other entities, and independently
of convention. For a thing to be inherently nonexistent is for it to not exist

in any sense at all-not even conventionally or dependently.
With this in mind, we can see how Nagarjuna defends dependent
arising while rejecting causation. He notes (1:6) that if entities are conceived as inherently existent, they exist independently, and hence need
no conditions for their production. Indeed, they could not be produced
if they exist in this way. On the other hand, if things exist in no way
whatsoever, it follows trivially that they have no conditions. This verse
and the several that follow (1:6-10) make this point with regard to each
of the four kinds of conditions.

What is important about this strand of the argument? Nagarjuna is
drawing attention to the connection between a causal-power view of
causation and an essentialist view of phenomena on the one hand, and
between a condition view of dependent arising and a conventional view
of phenomena on the other. Here is the point: if one views phenomena
as having and as emerging from casual powers, one views them as having
essences and as being connected to the essences of other phenomena.
This, Nagarjuna suggests, is ultimately incoherent, since it forces one at
the same time to assert the inherent existence of these things, in virtue
of their essential identity, and to assert their dependence and productive
character, in virtue of their causal history and power. But such dependence and relational character, he suggests, is incompatible with their
inherent existence. If, on the other hand, one regards things as dependent

Philosophy East & West

merely on conditions, one regards them as merely conventionally existent. And to regard something as merely conventionally existent is to
regard it as without essence and without power. And this is to regard it
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as existing dependently. This provides a coherent, mundane understanding of phenomena as an alternative to the metaphysics of reification that
Nagarjuna criticizes.

Verse 10 is central in this discussion.
If things did not exist

Without essence,
The phrase, "When this exists so this will be,"

Would not be acceptable.

Nagarjuna is replying here to the causal realist's inference from the

reality of causal powers to their embodiment in real entities whose
essences include those powers. He turns the tables on the realist, arguing

that it is precisely because there is no such reality to things-and hence
no entities to serve as the bearers of the causal powers the realist wants

to posit-that the Buddhist formula expressing the truth of dependent

arising7 can be asserted. It could not be asserted if in fact there were real

entities. For if they were real in the sense important for the realist, they

would be independent. So if the formula were interpreted in this context

as pointing to any causal power, it would be false. It can only be interpreted, it would follow, as a formula expressing the regularity of nature.
In the next three verses (1: 11-13) Nagarjuna anticipates and answers
the causal realist's reply. First, the realist argues that the conclusion
Nagarjuna draws from the unreality of causal power-the nonexistence
of things (where "existence" is read "inherent existence")-entails the
falsity of the claim that things dependently arise (1:11). For if there are no

things, surely nothing arises. This charge has a double edge: if the argu-

ment is successful it shows not only that Nagarjuna's own position
is vacuous, but also that it contradicts one of the most fundamental
tenets of Buddhist philosophy: that all phenomena are dependently arisen. Moreover, the opponent charges (1:11), on Nagarjuna's view that the
explanandum is not to be found potentially in the explanans, there is no
explanation of how the former is to be understood as depending upon
the latter. As Nagarjuna will emphasize, however (1:14), the very structure of this charge contains the seeds of its reply. The very emptiness of
the effect, an effect presupposed by the opponent to be nonempty, in
fact follows from the emptiness of the conditions and of the relationship
between conditions and effect. Hence Nagarjuna can reply to the opponents' attempted refutation by embracing the conclusion of his reductio
together with the premises it supposedly refutes.
How, the opponent asks, are we to distinguish coincidental sequence
from causal consequence? And why (1: 12) don't things simply arise randomly from events that are nonconditions, since no special connection
is posited to link consequents to their proper causal antecedents? Finally,
Jay L. Garfield
the opponent asks (1:13), since the phenomena we observe clearly have
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natures, how could it be, as Nagarjuna argues, that they proceed by
means of a process with no essence, from conditions with no essence?
Whence do the natures of actual existents arise? Nagarjuna again replies
to this last charge by pointing out that since on his view the effects
indeed have no essence, the opponent's presupposition is ill-founded.
This move also indicates a reply to the problem posed in (1:12); that
problem is grounded in the mistaken view that a phenomenon's lack of
inherent existence entails that it, being nonexistent, could come into
existence from nowhere. But "from nowhere," for the opponent, means
from something lacking inherent existence. And indeed, for Nagarjuna,
this is exactly the case: effects lacking inherent existence depend precisely upon conditions which themselves lack inherent existence.
Nagarjuna's summary of the import of this set of replies (1:14) is terse

and cryptic. But unpacking it with the aid of what has gone before
provides an important key to understanding the doctrine of the emptiness of causation that is the burden of this chapter. First, Nagarjuna

points out, the opponent begs the question in asserting the genuine
existence of the effects in question. They, like their conditions, and like
the process of dependent origination itself, are nonexistent from the
ultimate point of view. Hence the third charge fails. As a consequence, in

the sense in which the opponent supposes that these effects proceed
from their conditions-namely that their essence is contained potentially
in their causes, which themselves exist inherently-these effects need
not be so produced. And so, finally, the effect-containing conditions for

which the opponent charges Nagarjuna with being unable to account are
themselves unnecessary. In short, while the reificationist critic charges
the Madhyamika with failing to come up with a causal link sufficiently
robust to link ultimately real phenomena, for the Madhyamika philosopher, the core reason for the absence of such a causal link is the very
absence of such phenomena in the first place.
We are now in a position to characterize explicitly the emptiness of
causation, and the way this doctrine is identical with the doctrine of
dependent origination from conditions adumbrated in this chapter. It is
best to offer this characterization using the via media formulation most

consonant with Nagarjuna's philosophical school. We will locate the
doctrine as a midpoint between two extreme philosophical views. That
midpoint is achieved by taking conventions as the foundation of ontology, hence rejecting the very enterprise of a philosophical search for the
ontological foundations of convention (Garfield 1990). To say that causation is nonempty or inherently existent is to succumb to the temptation

to ground our explanatory practice and discourse in genuine causal

Philosophy East & West

powers linking causes to effects. That is the reificationist extreme which
Nagarjuna clearly rejects. To respond to the arguments against the inherent existence of causation by suggesting that there is then no possibility
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of appealing to conditions to explain phenomena-that there is no
dependent origination at all-is the extreme of nihilism, also clearly
rejected by Nagarjuna. To assert the emptiness of causation is to accept
the utility of our causal discourse and explanatory practice, but to resist
the temptation to see these as grounded in reference to causal powers
or as demanding such grounding. Dependent origination simply is the
explicability and coherence of the universe. Its emptiness is the fact that
there is no more to it than that.

Now this is certainly philosophically interesting stuff in its own right.

But as I suggested at the outset, there is more to it than just an analysis
of causation and dependent arising. For, as we shall see, for Nagarjuna,
among the most important means of demonstrating the emptiness of

phenomena is to argue that they are dependently arisen. And so the
claim that dependent arising itself is empty will turn out to be the
claim that the emptiness of phenomena is itself empty-the central and
deepest claim of Madhyamika ontology.

3. Chapter 24-Examination of the Four Noble Truths
While Chapter 24 ostensibly concerns the Four Buddhist Truths and
the way they are to be understood from the vantage point of emptiness,
it is really about the nature of emptiness itself, and about the relation
between emptiness and conventional reality. As such, it is the philosophical heart of the Mlaamadhyamikakjrika. The first six verses of the
chapter (24:1-6) present a reply to Nagarjuna's doctrine of emptiness by
an opponent charging the doctrine with nihilism. The next eight verses
(24:7-14) are primarily rhetorical, castigating the opponent for his misunderstanding of Madhyamika. The important philosophical work begins
with 24:15. From this point Nagarjuna offers a theory of the relationship

between emptiness, dependent origination, and convention, and argues
not only that these three can be understood as co-relative, but that
if conventional things (or emptiness itself) were nonempty, the very
nihilism would ensue with which the reificationist opponent charges
Madhyamika. This tactic of arguing not only against each extreme but
also that the contradictory extremes are in fact mutually entailing is a
dialectical trademark of Nagarjuna's philosophical method. Because of
the length of this chapter, I will not provide a verse-by-verse reading here,
but only a general gloss of the argument, with special attention to critical
verses.

The opponent opens the chapter by claiming that if the entire ph
nomenal world were empty nothing would in fact exist, a conclusi
absurd on its face and, more importantly, contradictory to fundame
Buddhist tenets such as the Four Noble Truths (24:1-6) as well as to

conventional wisdom. The implicit dilemma with which Nagarjuna confronts himself is elegant (24:6). For as we have seen, the distinction Jay L. Garfield
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between the two truths, or two vantage points-the ultimate and the
conventional-is fundamental to his own method. So when the opponent charges that the assertion of the nonexistence of such things as the
Four Noble Truths and of the arising, abiding, and ceasing of entities is
contradictory both to conventional wisdom and to the ultimate truth
(namely, on one straightforward interpretation, that all phenomena are
impermanent, that is, merely arising, abiding momentarily, and ceasing),
Nagarjuna is forced to defend himself on both fronts and to comment on

the connection between these standpoints.
Nagarjuna launches the reply by charging the opponent with foisting
the opponent's own understanding of emptiness on Nagarjuna. Though
this is not made as explicit in the text as one might like, it is important to

note that the understanding Nagarjuna has in mind is one that, in the
terms of Madhyamika, reifies emptiness itself. Verse 24:16 provides a
clue.
If the existence of all things

Is perceived in terms of their essence,
Then this perception of all things

Will be without the perception of causes and conditions.

The opponent is seeing actual existence as a discrete entity with an
essence. It would follow that for the opponent, the reality of emptiness
would entail that emptiness itself is an entity, and at that an inherently
existing entity. To see emptiness in this way is to see it as radically
different from conventional, phenomenal reality. It is to see the conventional as illusory and emptiness as the reality standing behind it. To adopt
this view of emptiness is indeed to deny the reality of the entire phenom-

enal, conventional world. It is also to ascribe a special, nonconventional,
nondependent hyperreality to emptiness itself. Ordinary things would be
viewed as nonexistent, emptiness as substantially existent. (It is important

and central to the Madhyamika dialectic to see that these go togetherthat nihilism about one kind of entity is typically paired with reification

of another.) This view is not uncommon in Buddhist philosophy, and
Nagarjuna is clearly aware that it might be suggested by his own position.

So Nagarjuna's reply must begin by distancing himself from this reified
view of emptiness itself and hence from the dualism it entails. Only then

can he show that to reify emptiness in this way would indeed entail the
difficulties his imaginary opponent adumbrates, difficulties not attaching

to Nagarjuna's own view. This brings us to the central verses of this
chapter (24:18 and 24:19):
Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation

Philosophy East & West Is itself the middle way.

228

This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 16:01:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Something that is not dependently arisen,
Such a thing does not exist.
Therefore a non-empty thing
Does not exist.

These verses demand careful scrutiny. In 24:18, Nagarjuna establishes a critical three-way relation between emptiness, dependent origination, and verbal convention, and asserts that this relation itself is the

Middle Way towards which his entire philosophical system is aimed.
As we shall see, this is the basis for understanding the emptiness of
emptiness itself. First, Nagarjuna asserts that the dependently arisen is
emptiness. Emptiness and the phenomenal world are not two distinct
things. They are rather two characterizations of the same thing. To say of

something that it is dependently co-arisen is to say that it is empty. To
say of something that it is empty is another way of saying that it arises
dependently.
Moreover, whatever is dependently co-arisen is verbally established.
That is, the identity of any dependently arisen thing depends upon verbal

conventions. To say of a thing that it is dependently arisen is to say that
its identity as a single entity is nothing more than its being the referent
of a word. The thing itself, apart from conventions of individuation, is

nothing but an arbitrary slice of an indefinite spatiotemporal and causal
manifold. To say of a thing that its identity is a merely verbal fact about
it is to say that it is empty. To view emptiness in this way is to see it
neither as an entity nor as unreal-it is to see it as conventionally real.
Moreover, "emptiness" itself is asserted to be a dependent designation
(Skt prajnaptir-upadaya [brTen Nas gDags pa]). Its referent, emptiness
itself, is thereby asserted to be merely dependent and nominal-conventionally existent but ultimately empty. This is, hence, a middle path with
regard to emptiness. To view the dependently originated world in this

way is to see it neither as nonempty nor as completely nonexistent. It is,
viewed in this way, conventionally existent, but empty. We thus have a
middle path with regard to dependent origination. To view convention in

this way is to view it neither as ontologically insignificant-it determines

the character of the phenomenal world-nor as ontologically efficacious
-it is empty. Thus we also have a middle way with regard to convention.
And finally, given the nice ambiguity in the reference of "that," (De Ni),
not only are "dependent arising" and "emptiness" asserted to be dependent designations, and hence merely nominal, but the very relation

between them is asserted to be so dependent, and therefore to be
empty.8

These morals are driven home in 24:19, where Nagarjuna emphasizes that everything-and this must include emptiness-is dependently
arisen. So everything-including emptiness-lacks inherent existence.

Jay L. Garfield
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So nothing lacks the three coextensive properties of emptiness, dependent-

origination, and conventional identity.

With this in hand, Nagarjuna can reply to the critic. He first points
out (24:20-35) that in virtue of the identity of dependent origination and

emptiness on the one hand and of ontological independence and intrinsic reality on the other, such phenomena as arising, ceasing, suffering,
change, enlightenment, and so on-the very phenomena the opponent
charges Nagarjuna with denying-are possible only if they are empty.
The tables are thus turned: it appears that Nagarjuna, in virtue of arguing

for the emptiness of these phenomena, was arguing that in reality they
do not exist, precisely because, for the reifier of emptiness, existence and

emptiness are opposites. But in fact, because of the identity of emptiness
and conventional existence, it is the reifier who, in virtue of denying the

emptiness of these phenomena, denies their existence. And it is hence
the reifier of emptiness who is impaled on both horns of the dilemma s/he

has presented to Nagarjuna: contradicting the ultimate truth, s/he denies

that these phenomena are empty; contradicting the conventional, s/he is

forced to deny that they even exist! And so Nagarjuna can conclude
(24: 36):
If dependent arising is denied,
Emptiness itself is rejected.
This would contradict

All of the worldly conventions.

To assert the nonemptiness of phenomena and of their interrelations,

Nagarjuna suggests, when emptiness is properly understood, is not only
philosophically deeply confused, it is contradictory to common sense.
We can make sense of this argument in the following way: common
sense neither posits nor requires intrinsic reality in phenomena or a real
causal nexus; common sense holds the world to be a network of depen-

dently arisen phenomena. So common sense holds the world to be
empty. Again, the standpoint of emptiness is not at odds with the conventional standpoint, only with a particular philosophical understanding
of it-that which takes the conventional to be more than merely con-

ventional. What is curious-and, from the Buddhist standpoint, sadabout the human condition, on this view, is the naturalness and seductiveness of that philosophical perspective.9
4. The Emptiness of Emptiness

Let us consider now what it is to say that emptiness itself is empty.

The claim, even in the context of Buddhist philosophy, does have a
somewhat paradoxical air. For emptiness is, in Mahayana philosophical
thought, the ultimate nature of all phenomena. And the distinction between the merely conventional nature of things and their ultimate nature

Philosophy East & West would seem to mark the distinction between the apparent and the real.
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While it is plausible to say that what is merely apparent is empty of reality,

it seems nihilistic to say that what is ultimately real is empty of reality,

and, as we have seen, the Madhyamika are quite consciously antinihilistic. But again, when we say that a phenomenon is empty, we say, inter
alia, that it is impermanent, that it depends upon conditions, and that its
identity is dependent upon convention. Do we really want to say of each

phenomenon that its emptiness-the fact that it is empty-is itself
impermanent, itself dependent on something else, itself dependent upon
conventions? It might at least appear that even if all other properties of
conventional entities were so, their emptiness would be an eternal, independent, essential fact.

It may be useful to approach the emptiness of emptiness by first
asking what it would be to treat emptiness as nonempty. When we say
that a phenomenon is empty, we mean that when we try to specify its
essence, we come up with nothing. When we look for the substance that
underlies the properties, or the bearer of the parts, we find none. When
we ask what it is that gives a thing its identity, we stumble not upon
ontological facts but upon conventions. For a thing to be nonempty
would be for it to have an essence discoverable upon analysis; for it to
be a substance independent of its attributes, or a bearer of parts; for its
identity to be self-determined by its essence. A nonempty entity can be
fully characterized nonrelationally.
For emptiness to be nonempty would be for it to be a substantial
entity, an independent existent, a nonconventional phenomenon. On
such a view, arguably held by certain Buddhist philosophical schools,
emptiness is entirely distinct from any conventional phenomenon. It is,
on such a view, the object of correct perception, while conventional
phenomena are the objects of delusive perception. While conventional
phenomena are dependent upon conventions, conditions, or the ignorance of obstructed minds, emptiness, on such a view, is apparent precisely when one sees through those conventions, dispels that ignorance,
and overcomes those obstructions. It has no parts or conditions, and no
properties. Though such a position might appear metaphysically extravagant, it is hardly unmotivated. For one thing, it seems that emptiness does

have an identifiable essence-namely the lack of inherent existence. So
if to be empty is to be empty of essence, emptiness fails on that count to

be empty. Moreover, since all phenomena, on the Madhyamika view,
are empty, emptiness would appear to be eternal and independent of
any particular conventions, and hence not dependently arisen. The Two
Truths, on such an ontological vision, are indeed radically distinct from
one another.

But this position is, from Nagarjuna's perspective, untenable. The best

way to see that is as follows. Suppose that we take a conventional entity,
such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, findingJay
that
L. Garfield
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there is no table apart from its parts, that it cannot be distinguished in a

principled way from its antecedent and subsequent histories, and so

forth. So we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that
emptiness-the emptiness of the table-to see what we find. What do
we find? Nothing at all but the table's lack of inherent existence. The

emptiness is dependent upon the table. No conventional table-no
emptiness of the table. To see the table as empty, for Nagarjuna, is not
to somehow see "beyond" the illusion of the table to some other, more
real entity. It is to see the table as conventional, as dependent. But the

table that we so see when we see its emptiness is the very same table,
seen not as the substantial thing we instinctively posit, but rather as it is.

Emptiness is hence not different from conventional reality-it is the fact
that conventional reality is conventional. Therefore it must be dependently arisen, since it depends upon the existence of empty phenomena.
Hence emptiness itself is empty. This is perhaps the deepest and most
radical step in the Madhyamika dialectic, but it is also, as we shall see,
the step that saves it from falling into metaphysical extravagance and
brings it back to sober, pragmatic skepticism.
Now, this doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness emerges directly
from 24:18.

Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation
Is itself the middle way.

For the emptiness of emptiness, as we have just seen, simply amounts to
the identification of emptiness with the property of being dependently
arisen, and with the property of having an identity just in virtue of
conventional, verbal designation. It is the fact that emptiness is no more
than this that makes it empty, just as it is the fact that conventional
phenomena in general are no more than conventional, and no more than
their parts and status in the causal nexus that makes them empty.'0
So the doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness can be seen as inextricably linked with Nagarjuna's distinctive account of the relation between
the two truths. For Nagarjuna, as is also evident in this crucial verse, it is

a mistake to distinguish conventional from ultimate reality-the dependently arisen from emptiness-at an ontological level. Emptiness just is

the emptiness of conventional phenomena. To perceive conventional
phenomena as empty is just to see them as conventional, and as dependently arisen. The difference-such as it is-between the conventional
and the ultimate is a difference in the way phenomena are conceived/
perceived. The point must be formulated with some delicacy, and cannot
be formulated without a hint of the paradoxical about it: conventional
Philosophy East & West phenomena are typically represented as inherently existent. We typically
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perceive and conceive of external phenomena, ourselves, causal powers,
moral truths, and so forth as independently existing, intrinsically identifi-

able and substantial. But though this is, in one sense, the conventional
character of conventional phenomena-the manner in which they are
ordinarily experienced-to see them this way is precisely not to see them
as conventional. To see that they are merely conventional, in the sense

adumbrated above and defended by Nagarjuna and his followers, is
thereby to see them as empty, and this is their ultimate mode of existence. These are the two truths about phenomena: On the one hand they
are conventionally existent and the things we ordinarily say about them
are in fact true, to the extent that we get it right on the terms of the
everyday. Snow is indeed white, and there are indeed tables and chairs
in this room. On the other hand, they are ultimately nonexistent. These
two truths seem as different as night and day-being and nonbeing. But
the import of 24:18 and the doctrine we have been explicating is that
their ultimate nonexistence and their conventional existence are the

same thing. Hence the deep identity of the two truths. And this is because

emptiness is not other than dependent-arising, and hence because emptiness is empty.
Finally, in order to see why chapter 1 is not only an essential ground-

work for this central argument, but in fact anticipates it and brings its
conclusion to bear implicitly on the whole remainder of the text, we must

note that this entire account depends upon the emptiness of dependent
origination itself. To see this, suppose for a moment that one had the view

that dependent arising were nonempty (not a crazy view, and not obviously incompatible with, and arguably entailed by, certain Buddhist doctrines). Then from the identification of emptiness with dependent arising

would follow the nonemptiness of emptiness. Moreover, if conventional
phenomena are empty, and dependent arising itself is nonempty and is
identified with emptiness, then the two truths are indeed two in every
sense. Emptiness-dependent arising is self-existent, while ordinary phenomena are not, and one gets a strongly dualistic, ontological version of
an appearance-reality distinction. So the argument for the emptiness of
emptiness in chapter 24 and the identity of the Two Truths with which it

is bound up depend critically on the argument for the emptiness of
dependent origination developed in chapter 1.
5. Simple Emptiness versus the Emptiness of Emptiness

We can now see why real causation, in the fully reified cement-ofthe-universe sense, as the instantiation of the relation between explanans

and explananda could never do from the Madhyamika standpoint. For
though that would at first glance leave phenomena themselves empty of
inherent existence, it would retain a nonempty feature of the phenomenal world, and lose the emptiness of emptiness itself. Moreover, a bit of Jay L. Garfield
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reflection should lead us to recognize the deep tension in this metaphysics: if the causal powers of things are ultimately real, it is hard to see how

one could maintain the merely conventional status of the things themselves. For they could always be individuated as the bearers of those
ultimately real causal powers, and the entire doctrine of the emptiness of

phenomena would collapse.
Substituting conditions for causes solves this problem. For, as we
have seen, by shifting the account in this way we come to understand
the relation between conditions and the conditioned as obtaining in
virtue of regularity and explanatory utility. And both of these determinants of the relation are firmly rooted in convention rather than
in any extraconventional facts. Regularity is always regularity-under-adescription, and descriptions are, as Nagarjuna puts it, "verbal designations." Explanatory utility is always relative to human purposes and
theoretical frameworks. Dependent origination is thus on this model a
thoroughly conventional and hence empty alternative to a reified causal
model, which nonetheless permits all of the explanatory moves that a
theory committed to causation can make. For every causal link one might
posit, an equivalent conditional relation can be posited. But the otiose
and ultimately incoherent posit of causal power is dispensed with on
Nagarjuna's formulation.
But if the foregoing interpretation is correct, we can make a more
radical interpretative claim regarding the structure of Mulamadhyamikakarika: the entire doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness and the unity

of the Two Truths developed in chapter 24 is already implicit in chapter
1. Recall the structure of the argument so far, as we have traced the
complex doctrinal web Nagarjuna spins: the central thesis of chapter 1 as
we have characterized it is that there is no inherently existent causal

nexus. The link between conditions and the phenomena dependent upon
them is empty. To be empty is, however, to be dependent. Emptiness
itself is, therefore, as is explicitly articulated in chapter 24, dependent
arising. Hence the emptiness of dependent arising is the emptiness of
emptiness. And the emptiness of emptiness, as we have seen, is equivalent to the deep identity between the Two Truths. So the entire central
doctrine developed in the climactic twenty-fourth chapter is present in
embryo in the first. And this is why Nagarjuna began with causation.
Now, to be sure, it is not apparent on first reading the opening
chapter of the Mulamadhyamikakarika that this is the import of the
argument. The rhetorical structure of the text only makes this clear in
retrospect, when enough of the philosophical apparatus is on the table
to make the entire framework clear. But once we see this framework, a
rereading of the text in light of this understanding of the opening chapter
Philosophy East & West

is instructive. For it is one thing to argue for the emptiness of some
phenomenon simpliciter and quite another to argue for that emptiness
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with the emptiness of emptiness in mind. If we read the opening chapter
in the first way, we are likely to miss the force of many of the particular
analyses in the text the depth of which only emerges in light of the deeper
thesis of the emptiness of emptiness. If one argues simply that a phenom-

enon is empty of inherent existence, one leaves open the possibility that
this is in contrast to phenomena that are inherently existent, and hence
that the force of this argument is that the phenomenon in question is not

actually existent. If, on the other hand, one argues that a phenomenon is
empty in the context of the emptiness of emptiness, one is explicitly
committed to the view that its emptiness does not entail its nonactuality.
Emptiness in this context is not nonexistence. The lack of inherent existence that is asserted is not the lack of a property possessed by some
entities but not by others, or a property that an entity could be imagined

to have, but rather the lack of an impossible attribute. This reorientation
of the argument gives what might appear to be a series of starkly nihilistic

analyses a remarkably positive tone.
We have time here to consider briefly one example of the difference
that this reading of chapter 1 induces in reading the subsequent text. We
will consider the analysis of motion and rest in chapter 2. I will not provide

a verse-by-verse commentary on the chapter here. But let us note the
following salient features of Nagarjuna's analysis: the target of the argument is a view of motion according to which motion is an entity, or at
least a property with an existence independent of that of moving things,
or according to which motion is part of the nature of moving things.
These are versions of what it would be to think of motion as nonempty.

Nagarjuna argues that from such a view a number of absurd consequences would follow: things not in motion but which were in motion in
the past or which will be in the future would have to undergo substantial

change, effectively becoming different things when they changed state
from motion to rest or vice versa; a regress would ensue from the need
for the entity motion itself to be in motion; motion would occur in the
absence of moving things; the moment at which a thing begins or ceases
motion would be indescribable. Nagarjuna concludes that a reification of
motion is incoherent. Motion is therefore empty.
So far so good. But then, is motion nonexistent? Is the entire universe

static according to Madhyamika philosophy? If we simply read this chapter in isolation, that conclusion might indeed seem warranted. It would

be hard to distinguish emptiness from complete nonexistence. We would
be left with an illusory world of change and movement, behind which
would lie a static ultimate reality. But such a reading would be problematic. For one thing, it would be absurd on its face. Things move and
change. Second, it would contradict the doctrine of dependent origination and change that is the very basis of any Buddhist philosophical
system, and which Nagarjuna has already endorsed in the opening chap-

Jay L. Garfield
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ter. How, then, are we to read this discussion more positively? Answering

this question is hermeneutically critical not only for an understanding of
this chapter, but-take my word for it-for a reading of the entire text,
which, if not read with care, can appear unrelentingly nihilistic. And on
such a nihilistic reading, the appearance/reality distinction that is forced
can only coincide with the conventional reality/emptiness distinction,
resulting in a denial of reality to the mundane world and a reification of
emptiness itself.

The positive account we are after emerges when we recall the empti-

ness of emptiness and read this second chapter in the context of the
reinterpreted first chapter: emptiness itself, as we have seen, according
to the analysis of dependent arising, is dependently arisen. It is nothing
but the emptiness of conventional phenomena, and is the fact of their
being dependent and conventional. If emptiness itself is understood as
nonempty, on the other hand, then for a phenomenon to be denominated empty is for it to be completely nonexistent. For then its merely
conventional character would stand against the ultimate reality of emptiness itself. We have just seen how this would play out in the case of
motion, and a moment's reflection would indicate that any other phenomenon subjected to this analysis would fare about as well. But consider, on the other hand, how we interpret the status of motion in light
of the emptiness of its emptiness: the conclusion that motion is empty is

then simply the conclusion that it is merely conventional and dependent,

like the putatively moving entities themselves. Since there is no implicit
contrastive, inherently existent ultimate reality, this conclusion does not

lead us to ascribe a "second class" or merely apparent existence to
motion or to movers. Their nonexistence-their emptiness-is hence
itself non-existent in exactly the sense that they are. Existence-of a
sort-is thus recovered exactly in the context of an absence of inherent
existence.

But existence of what kind? Herein lies the clue to the positive
construction of motion that emerges. The existence that emerges is a

conventional and dependent existence. Motion does not exist as an
entity on this account, but rather as a relation-as the relation between

the positions of a body at distinct times, and hence is dependent upon
that body and those positions. Moreover, it emerges as a conventional
entity in the following critical sense: only to the extent that we make the

decision to identify entities that differ from each other in position over
time, but are in other respects quite similar, and which form causal chains

of a particular sort, as the same entity can we say that the entity so

identified moves. And this is a matter of choice. For we could decide to

say that entities that differ in any respect are thereby distinct. If we did

adopt that convention for individuation, an entity here now and one
Philosophy East & West there then would ipso facto be distinct entities. And so no single entity
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could adopt different positions (or different properties) at different times,

and so motion and change would be nonexistent. It is this dependence
of motion on the moved, of the status of things as moved on their motion,

and of both on conventions of individuation that, on this account, constitutes their emptiness. But this simply constitutes their conventional exis-

tence, and provides an analysis of the means by which they so exist. The
emptiness of motion is thus seen to be its existence as conventional and

as dependent and hence as not other than its conventional existence.
And this just is the emptiness of emptiness. But in understanding its

emptiness in this way, we bring motion, change, and movable and
changeable entities back from the brink of extinction.

It is thus that seeing Nagarjuna's analysis of the emptiness of phenomena in the context of the emptiness of emptiness allows for a nonnihilistic, nondualistic, constructive reading of the Madhyamika dialectic,
but a reading which for all of that is rich in its explication of the structure
of reality and of our relation to it. But this reading is only accessible in the

chapters analyzing particular phenomena if we already find it in chapter
1. And this, I have argued, is possible once we reread that initial chapter
in light of the analysis in chapter 24. The Nagarjuna who emerges is a
subtle figure indeed.

6. The Importance of Causation
The analysis of causation can often look like a highly technical aside
in philosophy. It might not seem at first glance to be one of the really
"big" questions, like those concerning what entities there are, what the
nature of mind is, what the highest good is. By contrast, causation often
appears to the outsider or to the beginner like one of those recherche
corners of philosophy that one has to work one's way into. But of course
even in the history of Western metaphysics and epistemology it has
always been central. One has only to think of the role of a theory of
causation for Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, or Wittgenstein to see this. This

study of the Mulamadhyamikakarika shows why: a clear understanding
of the nature of the causal relation is the key to understanding the nature

of reality itself and of our relation to it. For causation is, as Hume, Kant,

and Schopenhauer as well as Nagarjuna emphasize, at the heart of our
individuation of objects, of our ordering of our experience of the world,
and of our understanding of our own agency in the world. Without a clear

view of causation, we can have no clear view of anything.
Nagarjuna begins by examining the causal relation for this reason
generally. But for Nagarjuna there is a further, more specific reason, one
which has no explicit parallel in the work of other systematic philosophers, though it is, to be sure, hinted at darkly in the work of those just
mentioned. For Nagarjuna, by examining the nature of dependent arising,
and by showing the emptiness of causation itself, we understand the

Jay L. Garfield
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nature of emptiness itself, and thereby push the Madhyamika dialectic of
emptiness to its conclusion. By showing causation to be empty, we show
all things to be empty, even emptiness itself. Nagarjuna begins here

because, by beginning with causation, the important conclusions he
drives at are ready at hand throughout the examination, even if they are
not made explicit until much later.

7. Antimetaphysical Pragmatism in Buddhism
When a Westerner first encounters the Mulamadhyamikakarika or

other Madhyamika texts, the philosophical approach can appear highly
metaphysical and downright weird. The unfamiliar philosophical vocabulary, the highly negative dialectic, and the cryptic verse form are indeed
forbidding. Most bizarre of all, however, at first glance, is the doctrine that

all phenomena, including self and its objects, are empty. For indeed
Nagarjuna and his followers do argue that the entire everyday world is,
from the ultimate standpoint, nonexistent. And that does indeed appear
to stand just a bit deeper into philosophical left field than even Berkeley
dares to play. But if the interpretation I have been urging is adopted, the
real central thrust of Madhyamika is the demystification of this apparently mystical conclusion. While it might appear that the Madhyamika
argue that nothing really exists except a formless, luminous void, in fact
the entire phenomenal world, persons and all, are recovered within that
emptiness.
And if what I have said is correct, the principal philosophical move
in this demystification of emptiness is the attack on a reified view of
causality. Nagarjuna replaces the view shared by the metaphysician and
the person-in-the-street-a view that presents itself as common sense,

but is in fact deeply metaphysical-with an apparently paradoxical,
thoroughly empty, but in the end actually commonsense view not only
of causation, but of the entire phenomenal world.

APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CHAPTERS 1, 2,
AND 24 OF THE MULAMADHYAMIKAKARIKA

(TRANSLATED FROM THE TIBETAN TEXT)

Chapter 1-Examination of Conditions
1. Neither from itself nor from another

Nor from both,
Nor from a non-cause

Philosophy East & West Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.
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2. There are four conditions: efficient condition;

Percept-object condition; immediate condition;
Dominant condition, just so.
There is no fifth condition.
3. The essence of entities

is not evident in the conditions, and so forth.
If these things are selfless,
There can be no otherness-essence.

4. Power to act does not have conditions,
There is no power to act without conditions.
There are no conditions without power to act.
Nor do any have the power to act.

5. These give rise to those,
So these are called conditions.

As long as those do not come from these,
Why are these not non-conditions?
6. For neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing
Is a condition appropriate.
If a thing is nonexistent, how could it have a condition?
If a thing is already existent, what would a condition do?
7. Neither existents nor

Nonexistents nor existent nonexistents are produced.
In this case, how would there be a "productive cause?"
If it existed, how would it be appropriate?

8. Certainly, an existent mental episode
Has no object.
Since a mental episode is without an object,
How could there be any percept-condition?
9. Since things are not arisen,
It is not acceptable that they cease.
Therefore, an immediate condition is not reasonable.
If something has ceased, how could it be a condition?
10. If things did not exist
Without essence,
The phrase, "When this exists so this will be,"

Would not be acceptable.
11. In the various conditions united,
The effect cannot be found.

Nor in the conditions themselves.
So how could it come from the conditions?

12. However, if a nonexistent effect
Arises from these conditions,
Why does it not arise

From non-conditions? Jay L. Garfield
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13. If the effect is the conditions' essence,
Then the conditions do not have their own essence.

So, how could an effect come
From something that is essenceless?

14. Therefore, conditions have no essence.
If conditions have no essence, there are no effects.
If there are no effects without conditions,
How will conditions be evident?

Chapter 2-Examination of Motion
1. What has been moved is not moving.
What has not been moved is not moving.
Apart from what has been moved and what has not been moved,
Movement cannot be conceived.

2. Where there is flux, there is motion.
Since there is flux in the moving,

And not in the moved or not-moved,
Motion is in that which is moving.

3. If motion is in the mover,

Then how would it be acceptable
When it is not moving,
To have called it a mover?
4. The motion of what moves?
What motion does not move?

Given that that which has passed is gone,
How can motion be in the moved?

5. If motion is in the mover,
There would have to be a twofold motion:

One in virtue of which it is a mover,
And one in virtue of which it moves.

6. If there were a twofold motion,
The subject of that motion would be twofold.
For without a subject of motion,
There cannot be motion.
7. If there is no mover

It would not be correct to say that there is motion.
If there is no motion,
How could a mover exist?

8. Inasmuch as a real mover does not move,
And a nonmover does not move,
Apart from a mover and a nonmover,

Philosophy East & West What third thing could move?
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9. When without motion,
It is unacceptable to call something a mover,

How will it be acceptable
To say that a moving thing moves?

10. For him from whose perspective a mover moves,
There is no motion.

If a real mover were associated with motion,
A mover would need motion.

11. If a mover were to move,
There would be a twofold motion:

One in virtue of which he is a mover,
And one in virtue of which the mover moves.

12. Motion does not begin in what has moved,
Nor does it begin in what has not moved,
Nor does it begin in what is moving.
In what, then, does motion begin?
13. If motion was begun in the past,
When should we say it began?
Not in the nongoing, not in the gone.
How could it be in the nonmoved?

14. Since the beginning of motion
Cannot be conceived,
What gone thing, what going thing,

And what nongoing thing can be conceived?
15. A moving thing is not at rest.
A nonmoving thing is not at rest.
Apart from the moving and the nonmoving,
What third thing is at rest?
16. If without motion

It is not appropriate to posit a mover,

How could it be appropriate to say
That a moving thing is stationary?

17. One does not halt from moving,
Nor from having moved or not having moved.
Motion and coming to rest
And starting to move are similar.
18. That motion is the mover
Itself is not correct.
Nor is it correct that

They are different.
19. It would follow from

The identity of mover and motion

That agent and action

Are identical. Jay L. Garfield
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20. It would follow from

A real distinction between motion and mover
That there could be a mover without motion
And motion without a mover.

21. When neither in identity
Nor in difference,

Can motion and the mover be established as existent,
How can they be established as entities at all?

22. The motion by means of which a mover is manifest
Cannot be the motion by means of which he moves.
He does not exist before that motion,
So what and where is the thing that moves?

23. A mover does not carry out a different motion
From that by means of which he is manifest as a mover.
Moreover, in one mover

A twofold motion is unacceptable.

24. A really existent mover
Does not move in any of the three ways.
A nonexistent mover

Does not move in any of the three ways.
25. Neither an entity nor a nonentity
Moves in any of the three ways.
So movement and motion

And Agent of motion are nonexistent.

Chapter 24-Examination of the Four Noble Truths
1. If all of this is empty,
Not arising, abiding, or ceasing,
Then for you, it follows that
The Four Noble Truths do not exist.

2. If the Four Noble Truths do not exist,

Then knowledge, abandonment,
Meditation, manifestation, and action
Will be completely impossible.
3. If these things do not exist,
The four fruits will not arise.

Then there will not be the enterers into the path.
If not, there will not be the eight [kinds of practitioner].

4. If so the assembly of holy ones
Itself will not exist.

If the Four Noble Truths do not exist,

Philosophy East & West There will be no true Dharma.
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5. If there is no doctrine and assembly
How can there be a Buddha?

If emptiness is conceived in this way
The Three Jewels are contradicted.
6. The attainment of the real fruits

And the Dharma will not exist, and the Dharma itself
And the conventional truth
Will be contradicted.

7. This understanding of yours
Of emptiness and the purpose of emptiness
And of the significance of emptiness is incorrect.

As a consequence you are harmed by it.
8. The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma
Is based on two truths:

A truth of worldly convention
And an ultimate truth.

9. Those who do not understand

The distinction drawn between these two truths
Do not understand

The Buddha's profound truth.
10. Without a foundation in the conventional truth

The significance of the ultimate cannot be taught.
Without understanding the significance of the ultimate,
Liberation is not achieved.

11. By a misperception of emptiness
A person of little intelligence is destroyed.

Like a snake incorrectly seized
Or like a spell incorrectly cast.
12. For that reason-that the Dharma is

Deep and difficult to understand and to learnThat (the Buddha's) mind despaired of
Being able to teach it.
13. If a fault in understanding should arise
with regard to emptiness, that would not be good.
Your confusion about emptiness, however,

Would not belong to me.
14. For him to whom emptiness is clear,
Everything becomes clear.
For him for whom emptiness is not clear,

Nothing becomes clear.
15. If you foist on us
All of your divergent views

Then you are like a man who has mounted his horse

And has forgotten that very horse. Jay L. Garfield
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16. If the existence of all things
Is perceived by you in terms of their essence,
Then this perception of all things

Will be without the perception of causes and conditions.
17. Effects and causes

And agent and action
And conditions and arising and ceasing
And effects will be rendered impossible.
18. Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation
Is itself the middle way.

19. Something that is not dependently arisen,
Such a thing does not exist.
Therefore a nonempty thing
Does not exist.

20. If all this were nonempty, as in your view,

There would be no arising and ceasing.
Then the Four Noble Truths

Would become nonexistent.

21. If it is not dependently arisen,
How could suffering come to be?
Suffering has been taught to be impermanent,
And so cannot come from its own essence.

22. If something comes from its own essence,
How could it ever be arisen?

It follows that if one denies emptiness
There can be no arising [of suffering].

23. If suffering had an essence,
Its cessation would not exist.

So if an essence is posited
One denies cessation.

24. If the path had an essence,
Cultivation would not be appropriate.
If this path is indeed cultivated,
It cannot have an essence.

25. If suffering, arising, and

Ceasing are nonexistent,
If through the path suffering ceases,

In what way could one hope to attain it?

26. If through its essence
non-understanding comes to be,
In what way will understanding arise,

Philosophy East & West Is not essence stable?
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27. In this way you should understand
the activities of relinquishing and realizing and
Cultivation and the Four Fruits.

It [essence] is not appropriate.

28. For an essentialist,
Since the fruits through their essence
Are already realized
In what way could it be appropriate to cultivate them?

29. Without the fruits, there are no attainers of the fruits,
Or enterers into that stream,
From this it follows that the eight kinds of persons do not exist.
If these do not exist, there is no spiritual community.
30. From the nonexistence of the Noble Truths
Would follow the nonexistence of the True Doctrine.

If there is no Doctrine and no Community,
How could a Buddha arise?

31. Your enlightened Buddha,
Without relying on anything, would have come to be;
Your Buddha's enlightenment,
Without relying on anything, would have come to be.

32. If by means of your essence
Someone were unenlightened,
Even by practicing towards enlightenment
He could not achieve enlightenment.
33. With neither entities nor nonentities
There can be no action.

What could the nonempty do?
With an essence there is no action.

34. With neither entities nor nonentities

The fruit would arise for you.

So, for you a fruit caused by entities or nonentities
Could not arise.

35. If, for you, a fruit
Were given rise to by either entities or nonentities,
Then from entities or nonentities

How could a nonempty fruit arise?

36. If dependent arising is denied,
Emptiness itself is rejected.
This would contradict

All of the worldly conventions.

37. If emptiness itself is denied,
No action will be appropriate.
Action would not begin,

And without action there would be no agent. Jay L. Garfield
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38. If there is essence, all of the flux
Will be unarising, unceasing,
And static. And so, the entire sphere of

Various arisen things would be nonempty.
39. If the empty does not exist,
Then action will be without profit.
The act of ending suffering and

Abandoning misery and defilement will not exist.

40. Whoever sees dependent arising
Also sees Suffering
And Misery and its arising

And the path to its cessation.

NOTES

Thanks are extended to the Venerable Lobzang Norbu Shastri and Ja

Gyatso for a very thorough critical reading of and helpful critical
ments on an earlier draft of this essay and of the relevant fragmen
the translation, and to G. Lee Bowie and Meredith Michaels for sou

suggestions regarding that draft. This essay has also benefited from
insightful questions posed by an audience at Mount Holyoke College
from the sound suggestions of Tom Wartenberg on that occasion.
deepest appreciation goes to the Venerable Geshe Yeshes Thap-Kas
his patient and lucid teaching of this text and discussion of Nagarju
position, and to the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, t
director the Venerable Professor Samdhong Rinpoche, and to my m

colleagues there, including those just mentioned and the Vener
Ngawang Samden and the Venerable Geshe Ngawang Sherab. Th

also to my research assistant both at the Institute and at Hampshi
College, Sri Yeshe Tashi Shastri, and to the Indo-American Fellows
program for grant support while I was working on these ideas.

1 - A fine point, suggested by Janet Gyatso: Though in the end, a
shall see, ultimate reality depends on our conventions in a w
it depends on our conventions in a very different way from t
in which conventional reality does. Despite this difference in t
structure of the relation between convention and reality in the
cases, however, it remains a distinctive feature of Nagarjuna's sys
that it is impossible to speak coherently of reality independent
conventions.

2 - Some argue that there is no real difference between causes and
Philosophy East & West conditions; some that a cause is one kind of condition; some t
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efficient causes are causes, and that all other causal factors contributing to an event are conditions. Some like my reading. I have found
no unanimity on this interpretative question, either among Western
Buddhologists or among Tibetan scholars. The canonical texts are
equivocal as well. I do not argue that the distinction I here attribute

to Nagarjuna, which I defend on hermeneutical grounds, is necessarily drawn in the same way throughout the Buddhist philosophical
world, or even throughout the Prasangika-Madhyamika literature. But

it is the one Nagarjuna draws.
3 - There are two kinds of case to be made for attributing this distinction

to Nagarjuna in this chapter. Most generally, there is the hermeneutical argument that this makes the best philosophical sense of the
text. It gets Nagarjuna drawing a distinction that is clearly suggested
by his philosophical outlook and that lines up nicely with the techni-

cal terms he deploys. But we can get more textually fine-grained as
well: in the first verse, Nagarjuna explicitly rejects the existence of
efficacy, and pointedly uses the word "cause." He denies that there
are such things. Nowhere in chapter 1 is there a parallel denial of the
existence of conditions. On the contrary, in verse 2 he positively
asserts that there are four kinds of them. To be sure, this could be
read as a mere partitioning of the class of effects that are described
in Buddhist literature. But there are two reasons not to read it thus.

First, Nagarjuna does not couch the assertion in one of his "It might
be said" locutions. Second, he never takes it back. The positive tone

the text takes regarding conditions is continued in verses 4 and 5,
where Nagarjuna asserts that conditions are conceived without efficacy in contrast with the causes rejected in 1, and where he endorses
a regularist view of conditions. So it seems that Nagarjuna does use
the "cause"/"condition" distinction to mark a distinction between

the kind of association he endorses as an analysis of dependent
arising and one he rejects.

4- The Venerable Lobzang Norbu Shastri has pointed out to me that
this verse may not in fact be original with Nagarjuna, but is a quotation from sutra. It appears in the Kamsika-prajinaparamitasutra as well

as in the Madhyamika-Salistambasutra. Inasmuch as these are both
late texts, their chronological relation to Nagarjuna's text is not clear.

5 - There is also a nice regress to be developed here that Nagarjuna
does not explicitly note in this chapter, though he does make use of
it later in the Mlaamadhyamikakarika (chap. 7): Even if we did posit

a causal power mediating between causes and their effects, we
would have to explain how it is that a cause event gives rise to
or acquires that power, and how the power brings about the effect.

We now have two nexuses to explain, and now each one has an Jay L. Garfield

247

This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 16:01:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

unobservable entity on one end. In Garfield 1990 1 explore this prob-

lem in more detail and note that it is explored both by Hume and
by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.

6 - The Madhyamika position implies that we should seek to explain
regularities by reference to their embeddedness in other regularities,

and so on. To ask why there are regularities at all, on such a view,
would be to ask an incoherent question: the fact of explanatorily
useful regularities in nature is what makes explanation and investigation possible in the first place, and is not something itself that can be

explained. After all, there is only one universe, and truly singular
phenomena, on such a view, are inexplicable in principle. This may
connect deeply to the Buddha's insistence that questions concerning
the beginning of the world are unanswerable.
7 - A formula familiar in the sutras of the Pali canon.

8 - Though this is beyond the scope of this essay, this last fact, the
emptiness of the relation between the conventional world of dependently arisen phenomena and emptiness itself is of extreme importance at another stage of the Madhyamika dialectic, and comes to
salience in the VigrahavyavartanTand in CandrakTrti's Prasannapada.
For this amounts to the emptiness of the central ontological tenet of
Nagarjuna's system, and is what allows him to claim, despite all
appearances, that he is positionless. That is, Nagarjuna thereby has a
ready reply to the following apparent reductio argument (reminiscent

of classical Greek and subsequent Western challenges to Pyrrhonian
skepticism): You say that all things are, from the ultimate standpoint,
nonexistent. That must then apply to your own thesis. It, therefore, is

really nonexistent, and your words are hence only nominally true.

Your own thesis, therefore, denies its own ground and is selfdefeating. This objection would be a sound one against a view that
in fact asserted its own inherent existence, or grounded its truth on
an inherently existing ontological basis. But, Nagarjuna suggests here,

that is not the case for his account. Rather, on his analysis, everything, including this very thesis, has only nominal truth, and nothing
is either inherently existent, or true in virtue of designating an inherently existent fact.

9 - This, of course, is the key to the soteriological character of the text:

reification is the root of grasping and craving, and hence of all
suffering. And it is perfectly natural, despite its incoherence. By un-

derstanding emptiness Nagarjuna intends one to break this habit and
extirpate the root of suffering. But if in doing so one falls into the
abyss of nihilism, nothing is achieved. For then, action itself is impos-

Philosophy East & West sible and senseless, and one's realization amounts to nothing. Or
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again, if one relinquishes the reification of phenomena but reifies
emptiness, that issues in a new grasping and craving-the grasping

of emptiness and the craving for nirvana-and a new round of
suffering. Only with the simultaneous realization of the emptiness

but conventional reality of phenomena and of the emptiness of
emptiness, argues Nagarjuna, can suffering be wholly uprooted.

10- Paradox may appear to loom at this point. For, one might argue, if
emptiness is empty, and if to be empty is to be merely conventional,
then the emptiness of any phenomenon is a merely conventional
fact. Moreover, to say that entities are merely conventional is merely
conventional. Hence it would appear optional, as all conventions are,
and it would further seem to be open to say that things are in fact
nonconventional, and therefore nonempty. This would be a deep

incoherence indeed at the heart of Nagarjuna's system. But the
paradox is merely apparent. The appearance of paradox derives from
seeing "conventional" as functioning logically like a negation operator-a subtle version of the nihilistic reading Nagarjuna is at pains to
avoid, with a metalinguistic twist. For then, each iteration of "conven-

tional" would cancel the previous occurrence, and the conventional
character of the fact that things are conventional would amount to
the claim that really they are not, or at least that they might not be.

But in Nagarjuna's philosophical approach, the sense of the term is
more ontological than logical: to say of a phenomenon or of a fact
that it is conventional is to characterize its mode of subsistence. It is

to say that it is without an independent nature. The fact that a
phenomenon is without independent nature is, to be sure, a further
phenomenon-a higher-order fact. But that fact, too, is without an
independent nature. It, too, is merely conventional. This is another
way of putting the strongly nominalistic character of Madhyamika
philosophy. So, a Platonist, for instance, might urge (and the Mad-

hyamika would agree) that a perceptible phenomenon is ultimately
unreal. But the Platonist would assert that its properties are ultimately real. And if some Buddhist-influenced Platonist would note
that among the properties of a perceptible phenomenon is its emptiness and its conventional reality, s/he would assert that these, as
properties, are ultimately real. This is exactly where Nagarjuna parts
company with all forms of realism. For he gives the properties a
nominalistic construal, and asserts that they, including the properties

of emptiness and conventionality, are, like all phenomena, merely
nominal, merely empty, and merely conventional. And so on for their

emptiness and conventionality. The nominalism undercuts the nega-

tive interpretation of "conventional" and so renders the regress

harmless.

Jay

L.

Garfield
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